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The Medicare prescription drug program started in January 2006, and constitutes 
the largest expansion of Medicare benefits since 1965.  There is an immediate need to 
understand the functioning of this program to better inform policy as changes have 
already been implemented and are continually being debated.  A much debated reform is 
the reduction in the number of plans. This is in response to the massive number of Part D 
plans, which has been argued to create large search costs when the elderly make their 
drug insurance decisions. A series of studies (Rice et al., 2008; Cubanski, 2008; Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2006a), advocate for a reduction of Part D plans. These findings 
indicate that there is considerable political pressure to limit the number of choices. 
In the absence of search costs, limiting the number of products in a market with 
differentiated products could lead to softened price competition, decreased product 
variety, or both. In light of the challenges the U.S. government faces in regulating this 
market effectively and the regulations currently in place, this paper studies the welfare 
impact of two easily implementable, and fundamentally different, approaches toward 
limiting the number of Part D plans: reducing the maximum number of plans each firm 
can offer per region and removing plans that offer a certain feature, namely donut hole 
coverage. Both approaches would result in a similar-sized reduction in the number of 
plans (approximately 20%).  However, the latter involves eliminating a dimension of 
plans’ characteristics, the net consequences of which depend on consumers’ valuation of 
that dimension versus firms’ ability to soften competition by differentiating along it.   
We believe the comparison between these two ways to reduce choice is 
particularly relevant for several reasons, in terms of providing valuable economic and 
policy-oriented insights.  First, current regulations dictate that providers can offer no 
more than three plans in any given region.  Recent law changes have attempted to limit 
the choice set further by discouraging seemingly redundant policies provided by a single 
firm and requiring firms to pull plans that have too few participants (Federal Register, 
2010).  Our first method of reducing choice follows the spirit of these changes by 
restricting firms to a maximum of two plans per region, and imposing this limitation by 
eliminating the least popular plan for firms that were offering three.  Second, legislation   3
has already started to take effect to close the donut hole, or gap, in all Part D plans 
offered (The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010; Shrank, W., 2011).  
Consumers currently can purchase plans that provide some gap coverage, but these plans 
are priced at a premium.  The regulatory change does nothing to limit choice per se; 
however, it will eliminate firms’ ability to differentiate along the gap coverage dimension.  
Our second method of reducing choice by removing gap covered plans both represents a 
fundamentally different alternative for reducing choice by a similar magnitude, and 
illustrates the amount by which differentiation along gap coverage is able to soften 
competition.  This latter aspect can help identify the importance of closing the gap, as it 
pertains to preserving competition in the face of fewer offerings.  Finally, the impact of 
adding (or subtracting) a dimension of product differentiation on consumer welfare is 
theoretically ambiguous – it can both improve it by adding a characteristic valued by 
consumers, but can worsen it by softening competition (e.g., Lancaster, 1975; Dixit & 
Stiglitz, 1977; Hausman, Leonard, & Zona, 1994).  Therefore, the effect of interventions 
to reduce plan choice is essentially an empirical question, which our analysis addresses  
for an important market and a particularly relevant dimension. 
To execute our comparison, we first provide evidence on the relative utility (or 
disutility) that the elderly derive from plan design features such as premium, deductible, 
gap coverage, etc. By measuring how seniors value these plan characteristics, we can 
assess whether they view Part D plans as differentiated products. Then, using our 
demand- and supply-side estimates, we assess the effects on equilibrium premiums and 
welfare from limiting each firm to its two most popular plans per region (as opposed to 
the current three) and from removing plans that offer donut hole coverage. In our analysis, 
we assume consumers are aware of all products in the choice set.  This approach allows 
us to measure, for each regulation strategy, the full potential welfare loss from reducing 
choice, i.e., those that would occur if we reduced choice despite consumers being fully 
informed.  These losses may result from the elimination of plans that consumers value 
and/or from higher premiums due to reduced competition. Hence, rather than assuming 
search costs in the model, our approach allows us to bound how high search costs must 
be in order to justify reducing choice. Importantly, our analysis allows us to determine 
whether one approach is clearly superior to the other.     4
Our empirical strategy utilizes discrete choice methods pioneered by Berry (1994) 
and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) to recover structural estimates of parameters of 
the demand and cost functions for the differentiated prescription drug plans (PDP). This 
method is especially appealing since it requires only aggregate data at the plan level, 
which are publicly available (e.g., plan market shares and characteristics)
1.  The estimates 
from this procedure allow us to measure the value of plan characteristics to consumers, 
price elasticities of demand for each plan, and the consumer surplus created by the 
market. We combine our demand system with a Nash-Bertrand assumption to generate 
equilibrium premiums and quantities, where firms take into account the expected subsidy 
they receive from the government. We then back out firms’ marginal costs and ultimately 
their producer surplus. The structural nature of the estimates allows us to conduct 
counterfactual policy experiments to see how prices and welfare would change if we 
made changes in program design.  
Using this approach, we have several key findings. When plans covering the 
donut hole are removed, the average premiums for other “enhanced” plans rise by 1.6 
percent while average premiums for non-enhanced plans rise by only 0.2 percent.
2  We 
find that consumer surplus and producer surplus fall by about 5.75 percent and 2.76 
percent, respectively. In addition, the number of seniors enrolled in any PDP drops by 2.9 
percent. In this case, we find that most of the welfare loss comes from seniors 
substituting for a less valuable option or dropping PDP coverage in favor of the outside 
option. The premium effect concentrates mostly within the set of closest substitutes, i.e. 
the remaining enhanced plans.  
On the other hand, when firms are limited to two plans in each region (as opposed 
to three),
3 we find more extreme results. In this case, the average premium rises by about 
5.5 percent and enrollment in PDP plans drops by about 11.7 percent. Consumer surplus 
falls by 15.3 percent and producer surplus falls by 11.34 percent. In this case, most of the 
consumer welfare loss happens via premium increases.  
                                                 
1 No individual-level data is available in the public domain linking individuals to their plan choices.  
2 Enhanced plans are plans that are actuarially more generous than the standard plan design for Part D, and 
for which the government does not subsidize the extra premium associated with the enhancement. One kind 
of enhancement is to provide donut hole coverage.  
3 We assume the firms drop the plan with the lowest enrollment in 2006.   5
The strong contrast in our measurements for these two counterfactuals highlights 
how differing methods for reducing the number of plans can have substantially different 
effects on equilibrium prices and welfare. Eliminating plans covering the gap and 
restricting firms to two plans per region reduces the number of plans by similar amounts: 
18 percent and 21 percent, respectively. However, the former approach eliminates a key 
mode of product differentiation. This leaves the remaining plans, which are relatively 
similar in features, to compete primarily on price.  In contrast, restricting firms to two 
plans per region still allows for all forms of product differentiation, which better enables 
firms to soften price competition. Although consumers do highly value gap coverage as a 
plan characteristic, our results strongly suggest that a mandated reduction in the number 
of plans will have the least consumer welfare losses if it is coupled with a restriction on 
plan features (ultimately restricting product differentiation).   
Before discussing implications, we validate the performance of our model out of 
sample by assessing the impact of a recent major merger between two Part D insurers.  
We then compare predictions of our model with what actually occurred and find our 
model performs quite well. 
The implications of our findings are several.  First, they suggest that offering gap 
coverage serves as a significant means of differentiation that quite effectively softens 
price competition between plans.  Along these lines, they also highlight the importance of 
coupling any reduction in plan offerings with a limitation on firms’ ability to differentiate 
plans.  In this market, preservation of price competition is important enough to warrant 
elimination of even a very highly valued product characteristic.  Finally, we note that 
recent legislation has attempted to reduce choice largely along the lines of our first 
approach (reducing the cap per region per insurer from three to two plans).  As our results 
show, this can lead to notable consumer welfare losses and higher prices, as a 
significantly smaller number of remaining plans can still differentiate themselves along 
the same number of dimensions.  However, given this is the approach used to reduce the 
number of plans, our results illustrate the possible merits of concurrent legislation 
designed to fill the gap for the remaining plans.  Filling the gap directly addresses the 
problem we identify, namely price competition that is “too soft” among remaining plans 
due to differentiation along gap coverage, by equalizing all plans along this dimension.   6
In supplemental analysis, we consider a completely different method of reducing 
choice, where the government sets a cap on total plans for each region and firms compete 
to have their plans included in the choice set.  Specifically, the plans with the ability to 
generate the most consumer surplus are granted access to the market.  We find that this 
radically different means of reducing choice via a general cap with ex ante competition 
can actually increase consumer surplus while reducing the choice set, even absent any 
reduction in search costs. 
Our work does not explicitly model adverse selection, dynamic pricing of firms 
exploiting switching costs, and the possibility of non-rational choices. These are all 
interesting avenues for future research when individual level data become available to 
researchers. At various points in the paper we provide insights about these limitations and 
their potential impact on our results.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
description of the Medicare Part D market and Section 3 provides a literature review.  
Section 4 details our empirical methods, and Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 
presents our results, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Description of the market 
Medicare Part D was signed into law as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 and went into effect in January 
2006. Unlike the Hospital Insurance (Part A) and the Supplemental Medical Insurance 
(Part B), the delivery of the new benefit is entirely through the private sector. Private 
companies can provide the new benefit as either stand-alone plans, called Prescription 
Drug Plans (PDPs), or they can offer it together with Parts A and B as Medicare 
Advantage plans (MA-PDs).
4   
Our study focuses just on the PDP market, leaving MA-PDs as part of the outside 
option, for several reasons.  First, given how fundamentally these options differ, it is 
reasonable to think that these are not close competing options for many people. It is likely 
                                                 
4 Before the enactment of MMA, private plans could also provide the benefits of Parts A and B of Medicare 
as Part C, later named Medicare+Choice.  However, the benefits of Parts A and B have been delivered 
mainly through the traditional fee-for-service Medicare, with private plans accounting for 12 percent of the 
total Medicare enrollees in 2005. (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005)   7
that consumers first choose whether to be in FFS Medicare or MA, and then choose their 
drug plans within those confines.  Second, prior studies on plan choice have all analyzed 
the PDP market as a separate market (e.g., Kling et al, 2008; Abaluck and Gruber, 2010) 
since consumers must be willing to forgo the entire Medicare FFS system in order to 
enroll in the MA form of drug coverage.  Finally, it is also the case that prescription drug 
coverage cannot be priced separately from the other features of MA plans (on which data 
do not exist) in the MA-PD market.   
Medicare beneficiaries can enroll in PDP plans by paying a 74.5 percent-
subsidized premium. Further price reductions happen according to income and dual 
Medicaid status. The first open enrollment took place from November 15
th 2005 to May 
15
th 2006, during which time the beneficiaries could make decisions about participating 
in this market. PDP plans enrolled 16.5 million of the 22.5 million Part D enrollees in 
2006.  In subsequent years, open enrollment takes place from November 15
th-December 
31
st of the previous year. In 2006, a total of 1,429 different insurance plans owned by 
approximately 70 different companies were available in 34 regions into which the 
country is divided.
5  In 2007 even more plans entered, with a new total of 1,875 plans 
across all regions, increasing the relevance of the debate about limiting the number of 
plans. For 2011, 1,109 plans are available (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010), partly as a 
result of regulations limiting the number of plans offered by sponsors starting in 2011. 
Dual eligible beneficiaries (those eligible for Medicaid as well as Medicare) are 
automatically enrolled in certain low cost plans, but allowed to switch to other plans.  
Although MMA specifies a standard drug benefit, the law allows deviations from 
that design as long as the modified plans are actuarially equivalent to the standard benefit. 
To the extent that the plan is more generous in actuarial terms than the standard benefit, 
the additional premium associated with the extra coverage is not subsidized by CMS. 
Most beneficiaries are locked in to their current plan for a full year, but are allowed to 
switch plans each open enrollment period at a premium that is community rated. An 
exception is made for Medicaid-Medicare dual eligible enrollees who are allowed to 
                                                 
5 The regions are composed of one or more states, and were set by the government at the beginning of year 
2005. The regions were established to meet the MMA requirement of having no fewer than 10 and no more 
than 50 regions in all, and to maximize the availability of plans to eligible individuals regardless of health 
status, with particular attention to rural areas. Most (25) PDP regions consist of one state, six consist of two 
states pooled together, one consists of three states, and one consists of seven states.    8
switch plans at any point in the year, and who may have to pay a small premium to the 
extent that they switch into certain higher priced plans. 
 The standard drug benefit design specified in MMA for year 2006 comprises a 
deductible of $250 and three coverage zones where the fraction of the additional drug 
dollar covered by the insurer varies substantially. Figure 1 shows how out-of-pocket drug 
expenses vary with total drug spending in the different coverage zones of the plan. The 
straight line has slope equal to 1, and represents the total cost (beneficiary premium plus 
total drug cost). The kinked line shows the out-of-pocket costs as a function of total drug 
cost.  The vertical distance, is therefore the size of the Medicare benefit.  After the 
deductible is exhausted, the elderly are covered 75 percent for the next $2,000 spent in 
total prescription drug expenditure (initial coverage zone, ICZ), 0 percent between $2,250 
and $5,100 (so the next $2,850) of total drug expenditure, the donut hole zone, and 95 
percent after the $5,100 threshold (catastrophic coverage zone). Thus, at the point that 
catastrophic coverage begins, the beneficiary has spent $3,600 out of pocket ($250 in 
zone 1, $500 in zone 2, and $2,850 in region 3).  
The plans offered are differentiated along several dimensions, such as premium, 
deductibles, gap coverage, number of drugs in the formulary, copay sizes, etc. Insurance 
companies can deviate in plan design from the standard benefit described above and offer 
a variety of plans as long as they satisfy certain requirements.
6   For example, an insurer 
can offer plans with lower or no deductibles and higher coinsurance rates for the initial 
coverage zone, or offer plans with tiered cost sharing in the initial coverage level as long 
as the tiered structure is equivalent to the standard 25 percent coinsurance rate.
7 Private 
insurers have taken advantage of the ability to offer modified plans and only nine percent 
of the 2006 plans (containing 22 percent of PDP enrollees in 2006) followed the standard 
                                                 
6 These are a) they should provide the same catastrophic coverage as the standard benefit (same cost 
sharing rule of 5 percent and same threshold of $3,600 in true out of pocket expenses) b) the deductible 
should not be higher than the standard benefit’s deductible of $250 c) assure actuarial equivalency of i) the 
value of total coverage (e.g., if they remove the deductible, the cost sharing in the initial coverage zone 
should be set higher than 25 percent), ii) cannot increase the threshold at which the 3
rd coverage zone ends 
(the end of the donut hole) and iii) cannot change the threshold at which the 3
rd coverage zone starts (start 
of the donut hole). These details are contained in the 2003 MMA. Also see Duggan et al (2008) for a 
description of the Medicare Part D program 
7 For example, a company cannot offer a plan with initial coverage limit higher than $2,250 (in 2006) that 
has a higher co-insurance rate above the deductible since this would violate condition iii) in the footnote 
above.    9
benefit design. The actuarially equivalent design (same deductible, different cost sharing) 
was adopted by 21 percent of plans containing 17.1 percent of enrollees, while the basic 
alternative design (smaller deductible with different cost sharing) was selected by 27 
percent of plans containing 44.2 percent of PDP enrollees.  
In addition to benefit designs that are identical or actuarially equivalent to the 
standard benefit, insurance companies can also offer enhanced plans. These plans become 
more generous than the standard benefit by including gap coverage, or lower deductible 
and lower cost sharing, or addition of non-Medicare covered drugs).
8 Gap coverage of 
generic and/or branded drugs in the donut hole was the enhancement that received the 
most attention because of the unpopularity of the donut hole in the first place. These 
enhancements were included in 43 percent of plans in 2006, containing 16.7 percent of 
PDP enrollees. Firms could design up to three benefit packages per region, as long as one 
of them was standard or actuarially equivalent to a standard plan (Hoadley et al, 2006). 
Although we do not model selection in our paper, we recognize that the 
community rated nature of Medicare plans could lead to adverse selection. One way that 
the presence of selection could affect calculation of welfare in the Part D market is that 
insurers constrain the plan choices they make available to guard against selection, leading 
to reduced welfare. Lustig (2010) finds evidence of this in the case of the Medicare 
Advantage market prior to Part D. Room for selection in Part D is much less likely than 
in the Medicare Advantage market because plan rules have been created in such a way 
that selection incentives are minimized. For example, the risk corridors referred to in 
footnote 10 below were particularly narrow in our year of study, 2006. Other aspects of 
the design such as rules about covering all drugs in certain classes, and government 
provision of 80 percent catastrophic reinsurance past the donut hole, also act to minimize 
selection. Even though selection is limited in scope, we comment later in the paper on 
ways our analysis may be affected if more selection occurs in the scenario of limiting 
insurers to two plans than in removing gap covered plans.  
                                                 
8 All plan formularies must include at least two drugs in each therapeutic category (see CMS 2007 for 
details of categories), and must include substantially all drugs in six key therapeutic classes. Plans are also 
forbidden to design formularies that discriminate against those with costly medical conditions (Hoadley 
2005); there is no evidence of heavy auditing of these requirements, but the threat remains.   10
To participate in the Part D PDP market, the insurance companies submit bids 
(separate bids for each region, even if they design just one plan to be offered nationally) 
stating their expected cost per beneficiary of providing the basic drug coverage. The 
expected cost is calculated with the understanding that CMS, and not the individual 
insurer, is responsible for 80 percent of drug costs that are incurred in the catastrophic 
zone.
9 This is required by MMA 2003, and is referred to as the reinsurance feature of Part 
D which lessens fears of adverse selection among private insurers.
10 CMS also asks plans 
to separately inform them of the cost of covering an individual if CMS were to not 
provide this reinsurance, in order to assess the total amount by which CMS subsidizes the 
coverage. This reporting is also required by MMA to make sure that CMS’s total subsidy 
to Part D (which includes the subsidy through reinsurance and the ‘direct subsidy’ paid 
prospectively to the insurer) on average comes to 74.5 percent of the total cost of 
providing coverage. 
  As an example of the bidding process, suppose that there are three plans in the 
nation, coming in with bids (for reinsured coverage) of $93, $100 and $107 per month. 
Suppose that the value of reinsurance is 27% (the value assumed in a CBO 2004 report, 
CBO 2004), thus their total costs for non reinsured coverage is $127.40, $136.99 and 
$146.58, calculated as the earlier cost  divided by (1-.27). In order for CMS to satisfy the 
rule that the average plan is subsidized 74.5% by them in the form of reinsurance and 
beneficiary premium protection, the beneficiary premium must be set at .255*$136.99 = 
$34.93. In order for the premium of other plans to be set such that it equals the premium 
of the average plan plus or minus the difference between their and the average plan’s 
reinsured bid (which amounts to $7), the other plan premiums will be set at $27.93 and 
$41.93 per month. 
                                                 
9 This means that only 15 percent of the catastrophic cost will be paid by the insurance company as the 
remaining 5 percent is the beneficiary’s liability by the plan design. 
10 MMA also calls for “risk corridors” to further reduce adverse selection fears and incentives to cream 
skim. This means plans that have actual costs that exceeded their expected costs (after accounting for the 
reinsurance feature) by a sufficiently large amount, may receive additional payments to compensate for 
those losses. In the same way, if plans make larger than expected profits due to actual costs being lower 
than the expected ones, the plans would have to return those extra profits to the government. For years 
2006 and 2007, the plans will be responsible for all the profits and losses that are within a band of 2.5% 
from their expected costs. If the actual costs are bigger (smaller) than the expected costs by more than 2.5% 
but less  than 5% the government will pay (receive) 75% of the amount in that range. If the actual costs 
differ with the expected costs by more than 5% then the government will pay 80% of the amount beyond 
5% in the case of losses and receive 80% of the amount beyond 5% in the case of profits.   11
Ideally, our model of price competition would incorporate all aspects of the above 
mechanism in price calculations and formulation of firm strategies.  However, we are 
unable to fully replicate this process since we lack data on key components, such as 
reinsurance payments and the size of enhancements for enhanced plans. Consequently, 
we postulate that firms submit their bids having in mind the premium the beneficiary will 
pay as a result of the bidding process, because consumers will make their enrollment 
decisions based on this premium and the characteristics of the plan. Implicit here is the 
assumption that firms do not submit bids to strategically alter the ultimate subsidy – an 
assumption we argue is reasonable in this case due to the large number of plans in each 
region, and hence the very limited ability of one firm to notably alter the subsidy. In later 
years, firms’ bids were incorporated proportional to enrollment, raising the possibility of 
such strategic bidding, but because we analyze the first year of the program these effects 
are absent in our supply side model.  Consequently, we believe a Bertrand game with 
differentiated products, as discussed in Section 5, will capture the relevant features of the 
game. 
We conclude this section by detailing some particularly relevant, recent changes 
in U.S. healthcare law.  In April 2010, CMS issued final rules on regulation #4085-F.  
These aim to reduce the extent to which insurers can offer multiple plans that are not 
substantively different from each other (as part of the three per insurer per region). This 
went into effect in 2010 for plans offered in 2011. If an insurer submits for approval a 
benefit structure that is not substantially different from other plans offered by the insurer, 
it will not be approved. CMS looks for differences in premiums, cost-sharing, formulary 
structure, and benefits offered. When insurers merge, they have 2 years to reduce 
redundancies and come under the CMS rule. The aim of this change is to address what 
CMS believes is confusion caused by having too many plans that seem similar in the 
market (Federal Register, 2010)
11. Also, for the first time, CMS states that they may 
consider enrollment in the plan a criterion for whether they will approve the plan the next 
                                                 
11 For example, on p. 19681, the federal register states: “some have suggested that a significant number of 
beneficiaries are confused by the array of choices and find it difficult to make enrollment decisions that are 
best for them.  Moreover, experience has shown that organizations submitting bids under Part C and D to 
offer multiple plans have not consistently submitted plan benefit designs that were significantly different 
from each other, which can add to beneficiary confusion.  In this rule, we finalize a number of proposals to 
the way we administer the Part C and D programs to promote beneficiaries making the best plan choice that 
suits their needs.”   12
year. If a plan did not attract “enough” customers in the past, they may not get to offer it 
again next year. 
Briefly, some relevant provisions of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 for 
Medicare Part D include the following.  First, in 2010 a one-time tax exempt subsidy 
check of $250 was mailed out to those who hit the donut hole.  Second, in 2011 a 50% 
discount on eligible brand name drugs when in the donut hole was implemented with the 
discounts to be provided by the drug manufacturers.  Third, from 2013 to 2020, the 
percentage covered by the government of branded drugs in the donut hole will increase 
from 0% in 2010, to 2.5% in 2013, and to 25% by 2020. The 50% discount for eligible 
branded drugs will be on top of that, so that the total percent reduction in price from the 
sticker price for those in the donut hole will be 75%; thus, the donut hole will be “closed” 
for branded drugs. The generic drug subsidy by the government will expand from 7% in 
2011 to 75% by 2020. Finally, the spending amount that gets one into the donut hole will 
also increase incrementally (by approximately $10 per year between 2010 and 2020). 
 
3. Previous literature  
  Many recent papers have studied several aspects of Medicare Part D in order to 
guide future policy. Lakdawalla and Sood (2007) propose and calibrate a dynamic model 
to study the welfare effects of Medicare Part D, focusing on pharmaceutical innovation. 
They find that public drug insurance can be welfare enhancing by lowering the static 
welfare loss coming from the monopoly power granted by patent protection, and by 
encouraging innovation from pharmaceutical firms. Their study provides insights on a 
separate important policy issue, which is whether the government should be allowed to 
participate in price negotiations. They find that price negotiation by the government 
could slightly distort the monopoly price and decrease the deadweight loss from optimal 
monopoly pricing, and this would not have a negative effect on innovation as long as 
patent lengths are increased.  Their result is consistent with the traditional “long and 
narrow” dynamic optimal patent.  Heiss, McFadden and Winter (2006) surveyed seniors 
through WebTV devices to study consumers’ perceptions and choices of Medicare Part D 
plans during the open enrollment period. They found that most seniors chose the optimal 
action of enrolling. This result was expected since, according to their calculations,   13
enrolling in Medicare Part D was immediately beneficial for 81.7 percent of the 
population, and inter-temporally beneficial for 97.5 percent.  With respect to their choice 
of plan, they found that consumers often chose cheaper plans when more expensive and 
comprehensive coverage was actuarially favorable.  
Kling et al (2008) conduct an experiment in which they recruit a sample of seniors 
from Wisconsin, find out their current list of medications taken, provide half with 
customized information and compare their plan choices to the other half which serve as a 
control group. They find that customized information (data on the prices of drugs under 
different plans and a recommendation of the cheapest plans for them, based on their 
current medications) leads the treatment group to select a plan that is cheaper by $104 a 
year for them in predicted terms than the control group. Whether we should expect this to 
be zero optimally depends on whether consumers value non-price features like insurer 
reputation, as well as whether customers should choose an insurance plan only based on 
current information. Domino et al (2008) point out that about ½ of all seniors are likely to 
have medication experiences over the next 12 months that would have, in retrospect, 
made another plan appear cheaper than the one that is the cheapest based on current 
medications.  
  Other papers that report results of surveys that include seniors post Part D are 
Neuman et al (2007) and Levy and Weir (2007), both confirming the overall percent of 
seniors who are uninsured for prescription drugs fell to around 10 percent in 2006. 
Closest in spirit to our work is Town and Liu (2003), who estimate the welfare 
impact of Medicare HMOs during the 1993 to 2000 period. They found big increases in 
consumer surplus due to the introduction of Medicare HMOs, and a sizable portion of 
that surplus in the last year of their study (45 percent) comes from making available 
prescription drugs to the elderly through these plans. They study the effect of 
counterfactuals such as what would happen to welfare if more plans were added to the 
markets, and find increases in consumer surplus, stemming mostly from increased price 
competition. In Medicare HMO markets, whose geographic unit is a county, the number 
of options available to consumers was quite limited, with the most frequent market 
structure being monopoly. This paper provided early evidence that broad prescription 
drug coverage for the elderly could be achieved through private managed care plans, and   14
that competition in Medicare HMO markets increased consumer welfare. Our work 
complements theirs by showing that competition enhances consumer surplus under a very 
different market structure, one with many more competitors. In addition, we show that 
product differentiation could play an important role when considering mechanisms for 
limiting choices.   
A primary motivation for our work comes from studies that document the 
prevailing desire among seniors and other interested parties to see reduced choice in the 
Part D market. A Kaiser Family Foundation-Harvard School of Public Health poll 
conducted during the open enrollment period 2006
12 found that seniors favor 
simplification,
13 removing the donut hole,
14 and reducing the number of plans available.
15 
Only 11 percent strongly favored keeping the program as is. Rice et al (2008) proposes 
that CMS “acts as a broker to winnow down the number of choices so that beneficiaries 
face a small subset of those judged to be best on several dimensions,” specifically 
limiting the number of choices that consumers would face to 10 per region, with 8 being 
national plans and 2 being regional or state-only plans. CMS would select these plans 
from bids submitted by insurers (up to 3 bids each), so that the 10 choices selected would 
provide lower-cost, lower-coverage options as well as higher-cost, higher-coverage 
options. The study then goes on to describe the logistics of three cases where the 
government has acted as an agent for consumers in selecting the options they face: 
pension plans for state employees (New York and Ohio), Arizona’s Medicaid program, 
and California’s Medicaid hospital contracting.  
Lab surveys also find seniors expressing preference for reduced choice. Reed, 
Mikels and Simon (2008) find that seniors report desiring fewer choices across several 
domains than younger adults, and that the gap is larger for health care domains (including 
drug plans). Mikels, Reed and Simon (2009) find that seniors report lower willingness to 
pay for increasing the number of choices available for drug coverage plans than younger 
adults. Both findings are consistent with older adults experiencing decreased decision-
making capacity and high search costs. Cubanski (2008) reports that 49 percent of seniors 
                                                 
12 Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006b.  
13 51 percent of seniors ‘strongly agree’ that the design of part D is ‘too complicated’. 
14 46 percent ‘strongly favor’ spending more government money to remove the coverage gap. 
15 44 percent of seniors ‘strongly favor’ reducing the number of plans.   15
enrolled in Part D say in the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2006 that there are 
‘too many’ drug plans to choose from.  Although there are benefits from reduced 
cognitive loads /reduced search costs when seniors have fewer choices from which to 
choose their drug coverage, our paper’s counterfactual exercises quantify the potential 
welfare losses when certain reductions occur.  These losses stem from reduced 
competition and the fact that eliminating choices risks some consumers losing their most 
preferred option.   
 
4. Empirical method 
 
  For our empirical analysis, we estimate the structural parameters of the demand 
and supply sides of the market. The approach follows that in previous literature such as 
Berry (1994), Berry et al. (1995), Bresnahan et al. (1997), Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002), 
and Town and Liu (2003).   
 
Demand Estimation 
For our demand-side analysis, we estimate demand(s) for differentiated PDPs 
using aggregate data following the seminal works of Berry (1994) and Berry, et al. (1995), 
henceforth BLP. The approach is as follows.  First, we write down an expression for the 
utility experienced by an individual from purchasing a given Medicare Part D plan as a 
function of plan characteristics, premium, and unobservables.  Given this utility function, 
we next derive a formula (utilizing simulation) for the market share that should result for 
a given plan. Market shares represent the outcome of consumer decision-making in the 
aggregate.   
  Each individual is assumed to maximize her utility by choosing among the  1 t J +  
alternatives for prescription drug coverage available to her in the following way: 
 
(1) 
   
 0,…,                       
             
                    
  i = 1,…,I  j = 0,…, t J   t = 1,…,T 
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where  jt p  is the premium of plan j in market t, Enhjt is a dummy variable indicating 
whether plan j is an enhanced plan,  'jt X  is a vector of other observable plan 
characteristics (e.g., deductible),  jt ξ  is an unobserved (by the econometrician) product 
characteristic, and  ijt ε  is a random, idiosyncratic utility shock for individual i for plan j in 
market t from the distribution       .  We normalize the utility for the “outside option” (j 
= 0) to zero.  The outside option is composed of choosing an MA-PD plan, choosing 
employer retirement coverage, or choosing not to enroll in any plan. 
In the above framework, we allow for individual-specific marginal utilities for 
price and whether the plan was enhanced (as indicated by the i subscripts on the β’s)
16.  
We follow the standard random coefficients approach by assuming these β parameters are 
independent draws from      ;   – a set of distributions characterized by θ.  A key merit 
of this approach is that it allows for much more flexible substitution patterns (i.e., cross-
price elasticities) and own-price elasticities than more restrictive models, such as the 
simple logit or nested logit.    
Given this formulation for utility, we can derive a formula for each product j’s 
market share in a given market t.  Conceptually, this formula calculates the probability 
that a given individual draws a set of β’s and ε’s such that the utility from choosing 
product j is at least as high as the utility of choosing any other product.  Formally, this is:  
 
(2)         ,   ,   ;             ;             ,   |                    
 
If we assume that        has the Type I extreme value distribution, we can 
integrate out this component of the above formula analytically, leaving us with: 
 
(3)         ,   ,   ;      
      
               
  ∑       
               
  
   
      ;      
                                                 
16 We have estimated versions with more random coefficients, and the parameter values and hence the 
results from our counterfactual exercises are robust to changes in the number of random coefficients. We 
prefer the specification with these two random coefficients as this provides more precise estimates, and 
allows for heterogeneous responses to changes in premia, the strategic variable in our model of supply, and 
on plan enhancements, which provides more flexible substitution patterns than the nested logit model.   17
 
A common approach to solving for the above analytical formula for market shares 
is to assume the β’s are draws from independent normal distributions with θ = (µ,σ); an 
assumption we make here as well.  Unfortunately, this leaves us with no closed form 
formula for the analytical market shares.  However, we can evaluate the above integral 
through simulation.  Specifically, we can take ns
17 draws from the joint normal 
distribution      ;   and simulate the integral using:  
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Empirically, our objective is to get estimates for the underlying parameters of this 
problem, θ, which represent the mean and standard deviation for the distribution of 
consumer tastes.  The typical BLP approach to solving for these parameters is to first 
isolate the implied product-level shocks (   ) by solving the system of equations: 
 
(5)         ̂     ,   ,   ;   
 
where Sjt is the observed market share for product j in market t.  This system is 
typically solved using a contraction mapping, and for each market t, it can be represented 
by the vector               ;  .   
With the vector of shocks in hand, we can construct a GMM estimator in the usual 
way, using appropriately chosen instruments (zjt).  Specifically, let h(zjt,xjt) be a vector-
valued function where we assume                ,         0.  Then, having solved for     as 
a function of observed market shares and θ, we can create the sample analog of these 
moment conditions as: 
 
(6)          
 
 ∑∑                ,     
  
   
 
     
 
                                                 
17 In our estimation the number of simulation draws is 200.   18
For a given weighting matrix W, the GMM estimator is     that solves: 
 
(7)     
 
          
 
       
 
         
 
  The above estimation procedure requires one to provide a starting value for θ, 
evaluate analytical market shares, use a contraction mapping to solve for      , evaluate 
the GMM objective function, Q(θ), and using an optimization routine, find the values of 
  that minimize the GMM objective function..   
  To map the above estimation procedure into our framework, we must specify the 
instruments we will use to construct our moment conditions, and ultimately     .  The 
primary reason we need to find instruments zjt is the concern that price is endogenous in 
our model.  That is, we fear price is correlated with the unobserved characteristic,  .  To 
this end, we construct our instruments following the insights provided in Berry et al. 
(1995) and Bresnahan et al. (1997). Specifically, they illustrate first order conditions 
(FOCs) for firms’ pricing decisions, and note that anything shifting these FOCs could 
serve as an instrument for price. They go on to note that characteristics of products in a 
similar group to product j (such as counts and sums of features) could be potential 
candidates, as these would tend to shift and/or rotate the demand curve for product j
18.  
The key identifying assumption in using these instruments is that the unobserved 
characteristic is mean independent of the observed characteristics. The intuition behind 
our choice of instruments is that they proxy the degree of competition faced by a plan in 
the product space.  We explicitly list our instruments below, after describing our data. 
    
Supply and Marginal Costs 
  On the supply side, we assume firms partake in Bertrand-Nash competition.  
Specifically, each firm maximizes its profit: 
  
(9)  Π
     ∑                               ,   ,   ;          
                                                 
18 See Bresnahan et al. (1997), pg. S33 for a more detailed discussion of the merits of these types of 
instrument choices.   19
 
where M is market size and  jt mc  is marginal cost for product j in market t and subst is the 
subsidy. This leads to the following first-order condition:  
 
(10)        ,   ,   ;     ∑                         
       ,  ,  ;  
    
       0  
 
  We can invert the system of first-order conditions to solve for marginal costs as 
follows: 
 
(11)           ∆  , ;         , , ;   
 
where mc, p, and s are vectors of marginal costs, premia, and market shares, and 
(, ;) pXθ Δ  is the appropriately defined matrix of own- and cross- price share derivatives 
(Petrin, 2002).  Once we have estimates for the demand-side parameters, we can directly 
solve for marginal costs using the above equation and the simulation method described 
above for calculating market shares and Δ(.). 
Using the estimated parameters of the utility function, we can calculate own- and 
cross-price elasticities for each product.  Further, combining these demand-side estimates 
with our marginal cost estimates, we can calculate welfare measures and conduct 
counterfactuals for the choice sets.  We describe these procedures, their outcomes, and 




This paper uses data on enrollment and plan characteristics of stand-alone Part D 
plans offered during 2006. Using the first year of data for this analysis has two particular 
advantages.  First, firms had less knowledge of regional demands for this product, 
reducing the likelihood that product characteristics are correlated with unobserved 
components of demand, making it less likely the product characteristics in our model are 
endogenous.  Second, as this is the first time consumers bought this product, there are no   20
switching costs.  For subsequent years, these could be relevant (Keating 2007) and would 
be difficult to fully capture using aggregate data. 
The CMS Landscape file contains basic characteristics of each plan (premium, 
deductible, coverage during the gap, number of top 100 drugs that are on the plan’s 
formulary or not, etc.).
 19 Enrollment data come from the CMS enrollment file for 2006, 
released July 2006. This file shows the number of people enrolled in each of 1,415 plans 
on which we have data on all items needed (with enrollment numbers under 10 
suppressed by CMS).  Certain plans are designated Low Income Subsidy (LIS) eligible, 
and were automatically assigned enrollees in the region who were previously qualifying 
for full Medicaid coverage. However, these plans are also the lowest cost options in the 
region by definition, and thus enjoyed high enrollment from voluntary enrollees, too. 
Ignoring that a sizable part of beneficiaries are auto-enrolled in the lower cost plans 
would make us overestimate the price sensitivity of consumers. Based on individual-level 
data from a national Pharmacy Benefits Manager (PBM), we are able to calculate the 
number of auto-enrollees per plan, assuming the auto-enrollment was random, as it is 
specified in the legislation. Knowing the number of auto-enrollees for each LIS plan, we 
are able to rescale the market shares to include only those who made an active choice.  
In using 2006 data, we capitalize on the advantages from studying a new market. 
However, a drawback to using early market data is that there may be systematic 
miscalculations on the part of consumers and producers. In the case of consumers, search 
costs are possible, but our approach is designed to assess potential welfare losses from 
alternative regulations when consumers are fully informed.   In the case of producers, 
insurers likely examined plan design strategies since the signing of the MMA in 2003. As 
one example, they could engage in data collection by participating in the CMS drug 
discount card program from 2004-2006. There is still room for systematic intentional 
mispricing if firms follow predatory pricing policies the first year. This is a problem that 
our models cannot address, and may exist in any setting when insurers perceive a change 
(such as when a new firm is contemplating entry, or when donut hole provisions are 
known to phase in over future years), not just in the first year. In fact, the problems of 
                                                 
19 This is available for download from [http://www.medicare.gov/medicarereform/map.asp] (access date 
May 2006).    21
dynamic pricing schemes may be less in the first year because each plan had presumably 
the same information set and incentives. In future years, dynamic pricing strategies may 
become more complex as plans differ in existing enrollment and take that into account 
when responding to new incentives.         
  Our data set consists of one observation for each of 1,429 plans (of which 
enrollment data are available for 1415 plans as the others enrolled fewer than 10) that 
were offered in the PDP market in 2006.  Of these, we observe all the relevant variables 
for 1,251 plans. We provide variable definitions and summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
We conclude this section by listing the variables we use as instruments for price.  
When choosing our instruments, we utilize a very basic division of products into 
“enhanced” and “not enhanced.”  Enhanced plans have added features such as gap 
coverage or zero deductible, while “not enhanced” plans are those that are actuarially 
equivalent to the basic plan. This basic division can help us better isolate the competitive 
circumstances for each plan, following the insights in Bresnahan et al. (1997) 
summarized in Section 4.  Hence, for a given market, the instruments we utilize for the 
price of plan j in group g (enhanced vs. not enhanced) sold by firm f are as follows: 
Count of plans in group g 
Sum of premiums of other plans in group g (other plans means plan j is excluded) 
Count of plans sold by firm f 
Count of plans sold by firm f in group g 
Sum of deductible of other plans in group g 
Sum of form_100 of other plans in group g 
Sum of auth_100 of other plans in group g 
Sum of under_20_100 of other plans in group g 
Sum of gapgen of other plans in group g 
6. Results 
6.1.  Economic Measures 
 
In the third column of Table 3, we present the parameter estimates for our random 
coefficients discrete choice model described in Section 4 (with region and firm fixed   22
effects)
20.  As noted in Section 4, we introduced two random coefficients, one on 
premium, and the other on enhanced. Using these estimates, we see that characteristics 
that should add value such as the number of top 100 drugs on the formulary, number of 
top 100 drugs with copay under $20, and branded drugs being covered in the gap have 
mean β estimates that are positive and significant, which is consistent with them adding 
value.  Higher deductibles and premiums reduce value as expected. These are all 
attributes that are easily observable, and important in choosing an insurance plan.  Prior 
authorization (Auth_100) has a counterintuitive sign that may be due to the fact that 
formularies that include better and more expensive drugs are more likely to require prior 
authorization.
21 It is also interesting to note that our estimates suggest seniors find little or 
no value from coverage of generics in the gap (in stark contrast to coverage of branded 
drugs).   
To help illustrate the robustness of our estimates, we also include parameter 
estimates from two simpler versions of our model:  logit and nested logit (with one nest – 
enhanced or not enhanced).  The results for these models are in the first two columns, 
respectively, of Table 3.  Comparing across models, we see a great deal of similarity in 
the estimates.  For the nested logit specification the parameter on the Enhanced 
characteristic corresponds to the within nest correlation (Berry, 1994). Our qualitative 
findings are robust to the use of any of these three model specifications. Given the greater 
flexibility of the random coefficients model, this is the one on which we focus for our 
remaining analysis. 
We begin our analysis by quantifying the value of the plan attributes to consumers, 
which is an important exercise given that the design of the plans is heavily influenced by 
policy. We find that consumers on average value a $250 decrease in the annual 
deductible by approximately $92 per year (250*(0.004/0.130)*12).
22 An extra top 100 
drug added to the formulary is worth approximately $6.50 on average. The coverage of 
branded drugs appears to be what seniors value the most with an estimated annual value 
of $380. 
                                                 
20 We present results from the first stage regression of price on our instruments in the Appendix. 
21 We thank Dan Miller for this insight. 
22 The coefficient on premium is the estimate for a household’s marginal utility from money.  Therefore, to 
determine the monetary value of a given characteristic, we must divide its coefficient by the coefficient on 
premium.  Also, our data are monthly, requiring us to multiply by 12 to get annual estimates.   23
Using the estimates from our baseline model, we can calculate own- and cross- 
price elasticities for the different plans using the following formulas: 
 
(12)        
       
       
  
   
   
        1                   if j = k 
(13)        
       
       
 
   
   
                      if j ≠ k 
 
The first formula is the own price elasticity; the second is the cross-price elasticity 
for plans j and k.  Given the large number of plans, we can only present a sample of our 
estimated elasticities. We are able to capture the intuitive result that enhanced plans are 
closer substitutes to each other than to non-enhanced plans. Table 4 shows a sample of 
our estimated elasticities for the players with the largest market shares.
23 The elasticities 
in the table show that enhanced plans, are closer substitutes to each other than non-
enhanced plans, and vice versa. Our estimates also allow us to calculate important 
welfare measures of this market.  In particular, we can calculate producer and consumer 
surplus for the current market environment, and then recalculate and compare these 
measures in our counterfactuals.  The formulas for these measures are as follows: 
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where the integral is calculated by simulation. Here, Mt is the number of potential 
customers in market t and  t subs  is the subsidy provided in market t
24.   
The first column of Table 5 contains our estimates for these measures for the PDP 
market as it was in 2006. Using (14), we find producer surplus was $1.27 billion. Then, 
using (15), we find that consumer surplus was $1.98 billion. It is interesting to see that 
                                                 
23 The table containing all the plans is available upon request. 
24 We calculate the subsidy as (74.5/25.5) times the mean of the premiums (post subsidy) for the non-
enhanced plans. This is because the enhancements are not subsidized by the government. Market size is 
defined as the sum of those who are enrolled in PDPs in the region plus those who chose the outside option.    24
the distribution of surplus between consumers and producers is skewed toward 
consumers; however, this is clearly due to the large subsidy in the market. We note that 
the consumer welfare calculations contain only those beneficiaries who made an active 
choice. The overall welfare provided by PDP plans would be larger if we included the 
LIS-eligible beneficiaries and the subsidies they receive.   
 
6.2. Policy Experiments 
 
Before conducting our two counterfactuals concerning limitation of choice, we 
seek to validate our model by simulating the impact of the merger of two important 
participants in this market, United and Pacificare, whose effect occurred between the first 
year and second year outcomes. The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division did 
challenge this merger, but the focus was on the firm’s commercial health care plans in 
Tucson, Arizona, and Boulder, Colorado (Department of Justice, 2005). There were no 
stated concerns involving the markets for Medicare Part D. The merger was ultimately 
allowed pending divestitures in these two markets.    
In this counterfactual, the bids in 2006 are treated as being submitted by two 
separate firms, and after 2006 they are treated as behaving as one firm.
25 We implement 
this counterfactual by perturbing the ownership matrix 
1 ) ; , (
− Δ θ X p  above as in Nevo 
(2000) and Town (2001). Implicitly, we are assuming that the firms do not change the 
menu of plans offered when they merge, and marginal costs remain the same, which we 
believe is a sensible assumption as the possible cost advantages are not materialized 
instantaneously. Therefore, the change in ownership structure is the only change to the 
choice set.  As shown in the second column of Table 5, our model predicts that the 
increase in market power due to this merger would result in a 4.7 percent increase in 
average premiums for the merged firms and a 0.9 percent increase in premiums for other 
firms. Consumer surplus would decline by 1.73 percent while producer surplus would 
increase by 1.15 percent.  
                                                 
25 The merger took place after the 2006 plans bids had been placed and the 2006 offerings decided by CMS. 
In announcing the merger, the CEO of Pacificare is quoted as saying: “This merger will enhance our 
resources, strengthen our product offerings…” (Press release from UnitedHealth, July 6
th 2005). The actual 
merger took place late 2005, before the 2007 plan bids were due (Cubanski and Neuman, 2006).   25
We then use post-merger data to provide some validation for our predictions 
about premium change. This is the only dimension for which actual data exists for 
validation. Because our model is static, it is not informative of the nominal premium the 
merging firms will charge post-merger, but it does provide information about their 
relative premium with respect to the average market premium. We observe from the 2007 
equivalent of our CMS landscape file that the actual 2007 premiums show a 4.0 percent 
increase of this ratio, whereas our model predicts a 3.2 percent increase. These results not 
only illustrate the effects of a merger of this magnitude on this market, but also 
demonstrate our model’s ability to produce sensible counterfactual results, consistent 
with economic theory and out-of-sample predictions.  
We now present the results for our two policy experiments focusing on the effects 
of removing plans from the market. The first of these policy experiments involves the 
removal of plans offering gap coverage.
26 This policy would reduce the number of plans 
by 18 percent. We perform this experiment to assess the welfare losses that would have 
occurred, had the government not allowed gap plans to be offered.  It also illustrates the 
consequences of an intervention that not only limits the number of choices, but also 
decreases product differentiation. As shown in column 3 of Table 5, we find that 
consumer and producer surplus decrease by 5.75 percent and 2.76 percent respectively.
27 
We decompose the total effects by premium and product substitution (including the 
outside option). We find that, in this counterfactual, the premium response is fairly 
limited, and that most of the loss in both consumer and producer surplus comes from 
substitution to less preferred plans. This result is consistent with theory. We would expect 
limited premium responses when a reduction in competitors is coupled with the 
elimination of a dimension along which products can be differentiated. At the bottom of 
the table, we show that the effect of this policy on equilibrium premiums is very small for 
non-gap and non-enhanced plans (0.8% and 0.2%, respectively), and even rather modest 
for remaining enhanced plans (1.5%), which we might think would be most able to 
                                                 
26 Both of these counterfactuals should be interpreted under the assumptions that firms do not change the 
design of their contracts when one of their own or competitors’ product is removed, and further exit or 
entry do not occur if a nest becomes more or less competitive.  
27 Our producer surplus calculations do not include fixed costs. Adding estimated fixed costs from an 
exercise imposing free entry equilibrium (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991) only shifts the calculated producer 
surplus down by a small constant given that the number of participating firms does not change across 
counterfactual scenarios   26
increase price after removing those covering the gap.  Enrollment is also moderately 
affected (-2.9 percent).  
The second of these policy experiments explores what would be the effect of a 
more universal limitation in the number of options. In particular, we consider the effect of 
restricting firms to a maximum of two plan offerings per region. When imposing this rule 
in our model, we assume firms keep the plans that had the largest enrollment. This 
experiment reduces the number of plans by 21 percent. As shown in column 4 of Table 5, 
we find that this counterfactual has a notably larger impact on both consumer and 
producer surplus.  We find that consumer surplus falls by approximately 15.34 percent 
and producer surplus falls by about 11.34 percent.  Enrollment falls by 11.7 percent. 
Decomposing the effects, we find that most of the consumer welfare loss comes from 
premium increases, which on average increased by 5.5 percent (as shown at the bottom of 
the table).  
The two policies we consider result in similar-sized reductions in plans, but have 
drastically different effects on welfare and premiums. By eliminating a dimension of 
product differentiation, the former forces the remaining plans to still compete heavily on 
price, resulting in minimal consumer surplus losses due to price changes (-0.63 percent). 
In contrast, the latter policy still allows firms to offer plans that cover the gap, preserving 
a dimension of product differentiation that allows firms to significantly soften price 
competition. Consequently, we observe a significant loss of consumer surplus due to 
price changes (13.51 percent).  When we calculate the loss in surplus (per capita) for both 
policy experiments, the former results in only a reduction of $9.61, while the latter results 
in a loss of $25.66 (approximately 2/3
 of the average monthly premium). Along with the 
loss of participation, these losses must be weighed against the expected gain due to 
reduced search costs when evaluating policies that reduce choice. Our findings strongly 
suggest that policies designed to reduce the number of plans will have significantly lower 
welfare costs if they also restrict firms’ abilities to differentiate their products.  
 
6.3. Robustness of the Results 
  In this subsection, we discuss the robustness of our findings, particularly with 
regard to our counterfactual results on choice size – the main focus of our analysis. In   27
particular, we address possible concerns about: 1) Our model choice and 2) The validity 
of instruments. Regarding our model choice, although the BLP model has become the 
standard for analyzing these types of data, we recognize that there may be concern about 
welfare measures given the presence of the idiosyncratic error terms (ε’). Specifically, the 
presence of these error terms increases the dimensions or product differentiation, and 
therefore, ensures that welfare always increases with the size of the choice set, and vice 
versa. In response to such a concern, we make two points.  First, our analysis is a 
comparison of welfare losses, and not a measure of welfare loss per se.  Consequently, 
for similar-sized reductions in the choice set, welfare losses due to elimination of the 
error terms should be roughly comparable and hence have little impact on the difference.  
Second, we could, in principle, control for congestion effects along the lines described in 
Ackerberg and Rysman (2005).  This essentially involves including a control for the 
number of products in a given market when it was observed.  In our model, such a control 
is effectively subsumed in our region fixed effects since the number of products only 
varies across region in our data. 
  The validity of our instruments may pose a concern since it could be argued that 
characteristics of Part D plans (that are used as instruments) are easier to adjust in the 
short-run than, say, automobile characteristics. We again make two primary points to 
address this concern.  First, we note that the reasonable accuracy of our out-of-sample 
validation in the merger analysis is consistent with a well-specified model.  Beyond just 
helping to validate our instruments, this helps increase our confidence that we are 
utilizing a well specified model.  Second, since 2006 was the first year this market 
existed, firms would have had relatively little demand information on which to condition 
their product offerings that year.  Consequently, more than any other year, we believe the 
assumption of exogenous product characteristics is quite plausible in 2006. 
  Given that current legislation is designed to both remove unpopular plans and 
close the gap, it is tempting for us to try and use our model to make predictions for this 
more elaborate counterfactual.  However, this counterfactual involves us actually altering 
existing plans’ characteristics, and therefore would require us to make adjustments to 
plans’ marginal costs. We could simply estimate a regression linking estimated costs to 
plan characteristics, but it is reasonable to believe this relationship will vary by region,   28
and likely by firm as well.  Consequently, our predicted costs for the adjusted plans will 
be either extremely noisy or impossible to estimate, making for an uninformative 
counterfactual.    
Finally, we note that we do not model selection in this paper, but it could be that 
despite the features of the market that reduce its scope, insurers may still adjust plan 
characteristics to avoid perceived adverse selection. If so, welfare may be lower than we 
calculate in the scenario with insurers restricted to a two plan maximum, because it 
leaves room for more selection due to greater product variety than when plan choice is 
reduced by removing gap covered plans.  
 
6.4 Discussion and a Possible Alternative 
The above analysis generates insights about recent American healthcare 
legislation and some important economics underlying a major healthcare market.  Recent 
legislation has attempted to reduce choice in a manner similar to our counterfactual of 
reducing the cap per region from three to two plans.  Our results indicate that this change, 
in isolation, can lead to notable consumer welfare losses and higher prices.  The insight 
here is that, after the change, the market is left with a significantly smaller number of 
plans that are still differentiated along the same number of dimensions.  Given the 
American government chose an approach similar to this to reduce the number of plans, 
our results show the possible merits of its attempt to concurrently fill the gap for the 
remaining plans.  By closing the gap, the government effectively equalizes all plans along 
this dimension of differentiation.  This directly addresses the problem of price 
competition being “too soft” among remaining plans due to differentiation along gap 
coverage. 
On a broader economic level, our results show that offering gap coverage serves 
as a significant means of differentiation that quite effectively softens price competition 
between plans.  Interestingly, we find that preservation of price competition is important 
enough in this market to warrant elimination of even a very highly valued product 
characteristic when reducing the size of the choice set.  As a result, any regulation 
seeking to reduce plan offerings is likely best served if it is coupled with a limitation on 
firms’ ability to differentiate.     29
Of course, there are many other ways that the American government can reduce 
choice in the Part D market, and it is certainly possible that there exist far superior 
alternatives.  We conclude this subsection by briefly considering what might be an 
ostensibly better approach, but that requires substantially more information from the 
regulator.
28  In particular, the American government could limit choice by setting a 
certain cap, X, on the number of plans allowed in each region, and then have firms 
compete to have their plans included in that set.  In an ideal scenario, the government 
would accept the top X plans as measured by consumer surplus.  Firms would choose 
plan characteristics and prices to submit for government evaluation, recognizing that their 
plans will only have access to consumers if they rank well in generating consumer 
surplus. 
Our model is equipped to evaluate such a counterfactual if we treat the set of 
potential plans as given.  That is, we fix the characteristics (both observed and 
unobserved) and the number of plans firms are willing to submit, and simply allow them 
to adjust their prices as they compete to be among the top X plans in a region. A 
complication of this approach to limiting choice is that there are billions of market 
structures to be evaluated, as consumer surplus will depend on the combination of plans 
that is selected.
29 We simplify the problem by observing that the consumer surplus in 
equation (15) can be calculated ex ante if the regulator knows the demand for each 
product and consumers’ heterogeneity. Also, if the regulator knows the marginal costs for 
each plan, the products can be ranked in terms of their potential to generate surplus if 
they priced at marginal cost. If X plans are selected, the last plan selected should provide 
at least as much surplus as the surplus that the X+1th plan would provide by pricing at 
marginal cost (call this value Sx+1). Proceeding in this way, the regulator can let the 
selected firms choose their prices with the requirement that at least Sx+1 is provided by 
each firm, otherwise firm X+1 would have been selected to enter.  
In Table 6, we report the consumer surplus, producer surplus and enrollment for 
varying levels of X, starting with 20.  As X declines, consumers lose surplus because they 
have fewer plans from which to choose but those losses are initially outweighed by the 
                                                 
28 We thank a referee for suggesting this counterfactual exercise. 
29 The average number of plans in 2006 is 36.7 plans. If X=20 there are 7.3 billion combinations of plans.   30
gains in surplus because firms must compete harder on price to have their plan included. 
We see that under this mechanism, 20 plans provide as much surplus as the baseline of 
36.7 plans on average per region.  As X decreases from 20, the competition effect 
dominates at first, resulting in increased consumer surplus.  However, at about X=10, it 
appears the value of the marginal plan lost is equal to the benefit from the increase in 
price competition.  After X=10, the loss of consumer surplus from losing plans dominates, 
and so consumer surplus begins to fall overall. 
This third alternative method of reducing choice suggests that, when combined 
with ex ante competition to be among the included plans, reducing choice could actually 
increase consumer welfare regardless of any reduction in search costs.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper studied the impact of reducing choice in the Medicare prescription 
drug insurance program. We used discrete choice methods for aggregate data to estimate 
the demand for stand-alone PDP plans, where each plan is a bundle of attributes to which 
consumers attach value. We provided evidence of the relative value of various features of 
the plan’s design. Assuming a Bertrand game with differentiated products, we were able 
to identify marginal costs for each plan, and provide welfare calculations. Our primary 
analysis focused on two easily implementable and fundamentally different policy 
experiments concerning reductions in the number of Part D plans, the results of which 
may help guide current and future policy in the area of choice limitation.  The first policy 
experiment removes plans covering the gap, and the second lowers the maximum number 
of plans per firm per regions from three to two. 
We found that regulating down the number of plans could have a large impact on 
consumer (and producer) surplus, depending on how the reduction of plans is made. We 
found that reducing choice will have a notably smaller welfare cost if it is coupled with a 
decrease in product differentiation. We also demonstrate that our model performs well in 
an externally verifiable counterfactual exercise, the merger of two insurers in this market.  
Each of the policy simulations in our paper is relevant for efforts currently 
underway to reform the Part D program. In one recent development, the number of plans 
in the Part D market is now reduced because CMS regulations issued in 2010 affecting   31
plans offered in 2011 prevent insurers from offering plans that are not substantially 
different from that firm’s other offerings. Also starting in 2010 are provisions to 
eventually remove the donut hole. Our work demonstrates the likely importance that this 
second change occurs concurrently with the first. Beyond the head to head comparison of 
these two ways of reducing choice, we also comment on the welfare implications of a 
third way that, to our knowledge, is not in the currently advanced policy efforts. Under 
this scenario, policy makers would restrict the number of choices available in a region to 
some specified level, and select only that many of the top plans submitted, based on 
expected welfare from models such as ours. Our calculations display how welfare 
changes according to the number selected, and imply that using this regulatory design 
would increase consumer welfare even if there were no search-cost induced welfare 
improvements to reduced choice.  
As policy makers look for alternatives to reduce the number of plan choices, 
further research is needed to explore the available alternatives more thoroughly.  In 
particular, further analysis of the benefits and costs of imposing a general limit on choice 
and having firms compete for the right to enter markets, and/or data that better allow for 
measurement of welfare effects when all plans provide donut hole coverage may be 
especially compelling.   32
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Figure 1: The Design of Part D Drug Coverage
 
Note:  
The graph above shows how the insurance benefit translates prescription drug costs to 
total out-of-pocket costs for a beneficiary.  The straight line is total cost (premium + drug 
costs) as a function of drug costs.  Therefore, it has slope of one and intercept equal to the 
premium.  The kinked line is out-of-pocket cost as a function of drug costs.  The kinks 
represent points where Medicare coverage changes.  The difference between these two 
lines is the Medicare benefit.  Source: Authors depiction of standard plan details 







Catastrophic coverage Table 1: Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
Premium Measured in dollars per month
Deductible Measured in dollars per year (annual deductible)
Form 100 Measures the number of drugs, of the top 100
drugs taken by seniors, that are on the plans for-
mulary
Auth 100 Measures the number of drugs, of the top 100
drugs for seniors, for which the plan requires prior
authorization*
Under20 100 Measures the number of drugs in the top 100 list
that have copays of under $20 during the initial
coverage zone of the plan
Gapgen Means that the plan covers generics in the donut-
hole portion of the plan
Gapgenb Means that the plan covers generics and brand
name drugs in the donuthole portion of the plan
*Prior authorization is a utilization hurdle whereby the physician must call
the plan for prior approval before prescribing that drug for the senior. The
number of drugs with these requirements rising means less generous coverage.Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Stdev Min Max
Enrollment 9,462.9 23,560.58 10 327,541
Market share 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.245
Premium 38.46 12.25 4.91 73.17
Deductible 74.4 108.8 0 250
Form 100 93.21 6.78 75 100
Auth 100 9.64 9.38 0 44
Under20 100 61.37 13.18 20 95
Gapgen .148 .36 0 1
Gapgenb .025 .15 0 1
Note: Sample size is 1251 when limited to plans that report
all the variables above.Table 3: Parameter estimates of demand models
OLS Logit IV Nested Logit BLP
Mean S.D.
Constant −9.26 *** −11.075 *** −8.94 ***
(1.256) (1.175) (1.847)
Premium −.12 *** −.13 *** −.13 ** .02
(.007) (.014) (.065) (.065)
Deductible −.005 *** −.002 ** −.004 ***
(.0008) (.0009) (.001)
Form 100 .07 *** .110 *** .07 ***
(.012) (.012) (.026)
Auth 100 .08 *** .062 *** .08 ***
(.009) (.010) (.017)
Under20 100 .002 −.002 .002
(.004) (.003) (.004)
Gapgen .03 0.029 .04
(.140) (.124) (.172)
Gapgenb 4.07 *** 4.802 *** 4.12 ***
(.396) (.572) (.979)
Enhanced −.75 *** 0.246 *** −.75 .27
(.171) (.089) (.534) (2.279)
GMM Obj. Func. 67.95
All speciﬁcations include ﬁrm and region ﬁxed eﬀects.
We denote *, **, and *** statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.Table 4: Average price elasticities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. United AARP -2.778 0.548 0.562 0.711 0.775 1.026 0.296 0.433 0.571 0.759 0.801 0.488 0.731
2. United MedAdvance 0.051 -3.568 0.060 0.077 0.084 0.106 0.029 0.046 0.061 0.083 0.089 0.054 0.081
3. Memberhealth Basic 0.159 0.180 -3.516 0.232 0.253 0.355 0.101 0.143 0.190 0.256 0.282 0.172 0.257
4. Memberhealth Choice 0.015 0.017 0.017 -4.508 0.025 0.042 0.010 0.013 0.018 0.026 0.029 0.017 0.026
5. Memberhealth Gold 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.017 -4.889 0.035 0.008 0.010 0.015 0.022 0.024 0.012 0.020
6. Humana Complete 0.072 0.084 0.085 0.119 0.146 -6.071 0.040 0.063 0.095 0.145 0.168 0.076 0.135
7. Humana Enhanced 0.172 0.190 0.190 0.232 0.266 0.331 -1.999 0.155 0.205 0.260 0.285 0.177 0.249
8. Unicare Rewards 0.076 0.086 0.088 0.111 0.121 0.150 0.045 -2.874 0.092 0.122 0.125 0.078 0.114
9. Unicare Plus 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.002 -3.781 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004
10. Unicare Premium 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 -4.829 0.004 0.002 0.003
11. Pacificare Comprehensive 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.011 -5.107 0.006 0.010
12. Pacificare Saver 0.104 0.117 0.120 0.152 0.165 0.219 0.064 0.092 0.122 0.163 0.174 -3.208 0.159
13. Pacificare Select 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.004 -4.691Table 5: Welfare and Policy Experiments
Baseline Merger Gap Plans Policy Two Plan Maximum
Consumer Surplus
Surplus 1,980,343,388.68 1,945,955,388.24 1,866,531,012.44 1,676,575,822.91
Diﬀ from Baseline −1.73% −5.75% −15.34%
Diﬀ from Baseline — premium ﬁxed −5.12% −1.83%
Diﬀ from Baseline — due to new eqm. premia −0.63% −13.51%
Producer Surplus
Surplus 1,277,592,635.18 1,292,299,536.11 1,242,258,114.46 1,132,617,178.45
Diﬀ from Baseline −1.15% −2.76% −11.34%
Diﬀ from Baseline — premium ﬁxed −3.20% −23.36%
Diﬀ from Baseline — due to new eqm. premia +0.43% +12.02%
Enrollment 11,838,069 11,686,956 11,485,345 10,452,922
Premium Eﬀects
Avg. Non-gap Premium 36.20 36.49
Avg. Premium Enhanced 39.60 40.23
Avg. Premium Non-enhanced 34.18 34.27
Avg. Premium 38.46 40.58
Avg. Premium Merging Firms 33.43 35.02
Avg. Premium Non-merging Firms 39.26 39.64Table 6: Allowing Only Plans with Highest Surplus
Number of Plans Consumer Surplus Producer Surplus Enrollment
(billion) (billion) (million)
Baseline (36.7 Plans) 1.98 1.27 11.83
20 Plans 1.98 1.24 11.84
15 Plans 2.00 1.17 11.96
11 Plans 2.09 0.98 12.42
10 Plans 2.10 0.92 12.49
9 Plans 2.07 0.90 12.42
5 Plans 1.86 0.76 11.65Appendix
Table A-1: First stage regression (Dependent variable is premium)
Parameter estimate S.E.
Count of plans in same group 10.446 2.345 ***
Sum of premiums of other plans in same group -0.159 0.012 ***
Count of plans sold by focal ﬁrm 0.659 0.911
Count of plans sold by focal ﬁrm in same group 0.015 0.455
Sum of deductible of other plans in same group -0.010 0.001 ***
Sum of Form 100 of other plans in same group -0.040 0.022 *
Sum of Auth 100 of other plans in same group -0.117 0.019 ***
Sum of Under 20 100 of other plans in same group 0.032 0.009 ***
Sum of Gapgen of other plans in same group -1.493 0.567 ***
F-stat: 21.8 (p-value < 0.01)
N = 1251
We denote *, **, and *** statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.